

STATE OF MONTANA
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE NO. 34-801

CIRCLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,

Complainant,

- vs -

FINAL ORDER

McCONE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 1,

Defendant.

No exceptions having been filed, pursuant to ARM 24.26.215,
to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended
Order issued on April 20, 1981;

THEREFORE, this Board adopts that Recommended Order in this
matter as its FINAL ORDER.

DATED this 15th day of May, 1981.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By John Kelly Addy
John Kelly Addy
Chairman

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned does certify that a true and correct copy
of this document was mailed to the following on the 21 day
of May, 1981:

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STATE OF MONTANA
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE NO. 34-80:

CIRCLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,

Complainant,

vs.

McCone County School District
Number 1,

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW;
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER

* * * * *

On August 15, 1980, the Complainant, in the above captioned matter, filed an unfair labor practice complaint with this Board charging the Defendant of violating Section 34-31-401(5) MCA. More specifically, the Complainant alleged that the Defendant did not bargain in good faith in that the Defendant entered into individual contracts with three teachers which did not conform to the negotiated agreement.

The Defendant, on August 29, 1980, filed an ANSWER to the complaint with this Board denying violation of Section 39-31-401(5) MCA.

On November 21, 1980, this Board issued a NOTICE OF HEARING which set a formal hearing in this matter for December 10, 1980. The parties to this matter agreed to vacate the scheduled formal hearing date to provide an opportunity to agree upon the facts in this matter and dispose of the necessity of a formal hearing.

By STIPULATION signed on December 31, 1980, the parties agreed upon the facts in this matter, set forth their contentions, identified remedies and set a briefing schedule. The last brief in this matter was received on February 13, 1981.

Complainant, Circle Teachers Association, was represented by Emilie Loring, Attorney, Great Falls, Montana.

1 Defendant, McCone County School District Number 1, was
2 represented by Chadwick H. Smith, Attorney, Helena, Montana.

3
4 COMPLAINANT'S CONTENTIONS

5 1. As the series of collective bargaining agreements
6 all provide for an individual teacher to waive educational
7 credits and/or experience by affidavit and no affidavits
8 were requested of nor signed by the three teachers, the
9 experience levels set forth in the salary schedules must
10 apply.

11 2. Individual bargaining which results in lowering
12 salary schedules for individual teachers is an unfair labor
13 practice, constituting failure to bargain in good faith with
14 the recognized exclusive representative of Defendant's
15 faculty in violation of Section 39-31-401(5), M.C.A.

16 3. Complainant is not required to utilize the griev-
17 ance procedure in an attempt to remedy an unfair labor
18 practice.

19 4. The Board of Personnel Appeals has jurisdiction to
20 decide an allegation of failure to bargain in good faith.

21
22 DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS

23 1. The named teachers received experience credit
24 based upon the information received from each of them at the
25 time of each teacher's first contract and they are now
26 estopped from attempting to vary the individual written
27 contracts based upon such information.

28 2. The named teachers are bound by the individual
29 teacher contracts they entered into for each of the years in
30 question. By signing the individual contracts, the teachers
31 waived any additional right which may have been available to
32 them by reason of earlier collective bargaining. Each

1 teacher knew the school policy on experience credit outside
2 of the system and accepted it by signing the individual
3 contracts offered.

4 3. Affidavits are not required for waiver of rights
5 under the master collective bargaining agreement. The col-
6 lective bargaining agreement does not require affidavits but
7 provides that affidavits "may" be given. The law of con-
8 tracts provides that the last writing between the parties is
9 controlling on any subject therein contained and the named
10 teachers did in fact waive any rights to salary greater than
11 stated in the individual contracts.

12 4. A waiver of a contractual right by a subsequent
13 written contract has no relationship to collective bargain-
14 ing. The individual teachers may enforce the collective
15 bargaining agreement if they desire or may waive any pro-
16 vision thereof individually if they desire. Such decision
17 by the teacher and the school district is not an unfair
18 labor practice and the waiver by subsequent contract is
19 legal.

20 5. The named teachers did not proceed to determine
21 the alleged grievance under the contracted grievance proce-
22 dure before proceeding with other quasi-judicial remedies
23 and therefore this untimely administrative proceeding must
24 be dismissed.

25 6. That each named teacher received the salary as
26 contracted and is not entitled to any further payment for
27 services or otherwise.

28 7. That the Board of Personnel Appeals lacks jurie-
29 diction over the subject matter stated in the charge filed
30 herein.

31 8. That the charge fails to state facts sufficient to
32 constitute a valid claim against the defendant upon which
any relief can be granted.

1 9. That the Defendant has not violated Section
2 39-31-401(1) and (5), M.C.A. of the Public Employees Col-
3 lective Bargaining Act, or any other section thereof.

4 10. That the Defendant has, at all times in the course
5 of collective Bargaining with the Complainant, bargained in
6 good faith in accordance with Section 39-31-305, M.C.A., and
7 has not interfered with, restrained or coerced its employ-
8 ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 39-31-291,
9 M.C.A.

10
11 REMEDY SOUGHT BY COMPLAINANT

12 Complainant seeks an order of the Board of Personnel
13 Appeals directing Defendant School District:

14 1. To make Dancer, Langton and McGarvey whole by
15 paying them the difference between their proper salary level
16 and the salaries actually paid between February 15, 1980 and
17 August 15, 1980 (for the six months prior to the filing of
18 the charge);

19 2. To place Daisy Langton on the eight-year experi-
20 ence level of the negotiated salary schedule, effective with
21 the beginning of the 1980-81 school year;

22 3. When Betty McGarvey returns from maternity leave,
23 to place her on the experience level consistent with four-
24 teen years of experience, BA + 1, of the negotiated salary
25 schedule, effective upon her return from maternity leave.

26
27 AGREED FACTS

28 1. McCone County School District No. 1, Defendant, is
29 a body corporate School District with administrative offices
30 in Circle, Montana. It is a political subdivision of the
31 State of Montana, created and existing under the Constitu-
32 tion and laws of that state. The District operates the
public elementary and high schools in Circle, Montana.

1 2. Circle Teachers' Association, affiliated with the
2 Montana Education Association, is the recognized exclusive
3 bargaining representative for the faculty employed in the
4 Circle schools.

5 3. In 1964 the Circle Education Association affili-
6 ated with the Montana Education Association and remained
7 affiliated through 1972. Sometime thereafter the Circle
8 Teachers' Association, an independent organization, was
9 formed and recognized by Defendant School District. Exhi-
10 bits A, B, and C were contracts with the independent organi-
11 zation. In September 1978 the Circle Teachers' Association
12 affiliated with the Montana Education Association. Exhibits
13 D, E and F were with the MEA affiliate.

14 4. There have been a series of collective bargaining
15 agreements between the parties attached hereto, as follows:

16 Exhibit A, 1975-1976 Agreement, executed March 3, 1975
17 Exhibit B, 1976-1977 Agreement, executed March 12, 1976
18 Exhibit C, 1977-1978 Agreement, executed May 9, 1977
19 Exhibit D, 1978-1979 Agreement, executed Sept. 12, 1978
20 Exhibit E, 1979-1980 Agreement, executed Nov. 14, 1979
21 Exhibit F, 1980-1981 Agreement, executed May 22, 1980

22
23 Each of the Agreements contained the following language:

24 "Educational credits and/or Experience: A teacher
25 may sign an affidavit to waive educational credits
26 and/or experience to enable them to be placed on
27 the salary schedule at a level mutually agreed
28 upon. Any future raises for this person based on
29 either vertical (experience) or horizontal (edu-
30 cational) advancement will be computed from the
31 agreed base and only education and experience
32 gained after the date of this waiver will be used
for advancement on this or future salary schedules."

33 5. Daisy Langton was employed as a teacher by the
34 Defendant School District in November, 1975. At that time
35 she had two years and eight months teaching experience in
36

1 other schools. She was given credit for one year previous
2 experience and placed at the first year level of the salary
3 schedule. She had a BA degree and has not earned sufficient
4 additional educational credits to move to the BA + 1 salary
5 column. Langton never signed an Affidavit waiving correct
6 placement.

7 Langton was placed upon the negotiated salary schedule
8 showing one year prior experience when she was hired for the
9 1975-1976 school year in that she reported only one year of
10 prior teaching experience. Later she contended she had two
11 years' prior experience and was moved up another year.
12 Langton entered into an individual written contract with the
13 school district for each school year, after the annual
14 collective bargaining agreement was signed, and accepted the
15 salary offered as taken from the negotiated salary schedule
16 without objection. No grievance procedure was followed as
17 provided in the collective bargaining agreement prior to
18 proceeding before the Board of Personnel Appeals.

19 Langton alleges placement and salary discrepancies as
20 follows:

21				Level Association Con-
22				tends Teacher Should
23				Have Been Placed and
				Salary Association
				Contends Should Have
	<u>Year</u>	<u>Level Placed and Salary Paid</u>		<u>Been Paid</u>
24	1975-76	1 (130 days) \$ 6,236	3	\$ 8,970
25	1976-77	3 9,480	4	9,770
	1977-78	4 10,560	5	10,800
26	1978-79	5 11,349	6	11,678
	1979-80	6 12,340	7	12,720
27	1980-81	7 14,100	8	14,520

28 6. Betty McGarvey was employed as a teacher by the
29 Defendant School District in August, 1975. At that time she
30 had had nine (9) years teaching experience, two of them in
31 the Circle school system and the balance in other schools.
32 She was given credit for five (5) years of experience and

1 placed at the five-year experience step of the salary sche-
2 dule. McGarvey had a BA degree in 1975 and was placed in
3 the BA + 1 salary column in the 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80
4 and 1980-81 academic years. McGarvey never signed an affi-
5 davit waiving correct placement.

6 McGarvey was informed when entering the Circle school
7 system that school policy provided that "Five (5) years'
8 maximum experience to be credited to teacher entering system
9 from other schools for salary schedule position". The
10 policy is applied by considering each entry from another
11 school as a starting entry. McGarvey was offered a first
12 year contract allowing five (5) years' prior teaching experi-
13 ence on the negotiated salary schedule. McGarvey accepted
14 the contract and the policy, and entered into an individual
15 contract with the school district for each school year,
16 after the annual collective bargaining agreement was signed,
17 and accepted the salary offered as taken from the negotiated
18 salary schedule without objection.

19 McGarvey alleges placement and salary discrepancies as
20 follows:

21				Level Association Contends		
22				Teacher Should Have Been		
23	<u>Year</u>	<u>Level Placed and</u>		Placed and Salary Associ-	<u>ation Contents Should Have</u>	
		<u>Salary Paid</u>		Been Paid		
24	1975-76	5	BA	\$ 9,750	9	BA \$10,686
25	1976-77	6	BA	10,770	10	BA 11,520
26	1977-78	7	BA + 1	11,980	10 (top)	BA + 1 13,020
	1978-79	8	BA + 1	12,862	11 (top step)	BA + 1 13,938
	1979-80	9	BA + 1	14,150	11 (top step)	BA + 1 14,980
	1980-81	(-----on maternity leave-----)				

27 7. Allan Dancer was employed as a teacher by the
28 Defendant School District in August, 1978. At that time he
29 had seven (7) years teaching experience in other schools.
30 He was given credit for five (5) years of experience and
31 placed at the fifth year level of the salary schedule. He
32

1 never signed an affidavit waiving correct placement. He is
2 no longer employed by the District.

3 Dancer was informed when entering the Circle school
4 system that school policy provided that "Five (5) years'
5 maximum experience to be credited to teacher entering system
6 from other schools for salary schedule position." The
7 policy is applied by considering each entry from another
8 school as a starting entry. Dancer was offered a first year
9 contract allowing five (5) years' prior teaching experience
10 on the negotiated salary schedule. Dancer accepted the
11 contract and the policy, and entered into an individual
12 contract with the school district for each school year,
13 after the annual collective bargaining agreement was signed,
14 and accepted the salary offered as taken from the negotiated
15 salary schedule without objection.

16 Dancer alleges placement and salary discrepancies as
17 follows:

Year	Level Placed and Salary Paid		Level Association Contends Teacher Should Have Been Placed and Salary Associ- ation Contends Should Have Been Paid	
1978-79	5	\$11,349	7	\$12,008
1979-80	5	12,340	8	13,090

22 8. Individual contracts were signed between Defendant
23 and the three teachers for each academic year involved. See
24 Exhibits G through S. These contracts contain the salaries
25 as set forth for each teacher in the "Level Placed and
26 Salary Paid" columns in statements of fact 5, 6 and 7.

27 DISCUSSION

28
29 There has been a series of collective bargaining agree-
30 ments between the Circle Teacher's Association (hereinafter
31 the Association) and McCone County School District No. 1
32 (hereinafter the District):

1 Exhibit A, 1975-1976 Agreement, executed March 3, 1975
2 Exhibit B, 1976-1977 Agreement, executed March 12, 1976
3 Exhibit C, 1977-1978 Agreement, executed May 9, 1977
4 Exhibit D, 1978-1979 Agreement, executed Sept. 12, 1978
5 Exhibit E, 1979-1980 Agreement, executed Nov. 14, 1979
6 Exhibit F, 1980-1981 Agreement, executed May 22, 1980

7 Each of the collective bargaining agreements contained
8 the following provision:

9 Educational Credits and/or Experience: A teacher
10 may sign an affidavit to waive educational credits
11 and/or experience to enable them to be placed on
12 the salary schedule at a level mutually agreed
13 upon. Any future raises for this person based on
14 either vertical (experience) or horizontal (edu-
15 cational) advancement will be computed from the
16 agreed base and only education and experience
17 gained after the date of this waiver will be used
18 for advancement on this or future salary schedules.

19 At time of hiring, neither Daisy Langton (employed
20 November, 1975), Betty McGarvey (employed August, 1975) nor
21 Allan Dancer (employed August, 1978) signed such "affidavits"
22 to waive educational and/or experience credits. Assuming
23 that individual teachers could waive or modify the terms of
24 a collective bargainig agreement by written affidavit, a
25 proposition upon which I decline to rule, attempts to alter
26 the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement
27 via this contractual method were not made. Thus, the ques-
28 tion of a "clear and unmistakable" contract waiver is not in
29 issue (see Tinken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746,
30 751, 54LRHM 2785 (6th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971,
31 55 LRMH 2878 (1964)).

32 At time of hiring and ensuing years the District entered
into individual contracts with Langton, McGarvey and Dancer
(Exhibits G through S). Each individual contract with each
of the affected teachers reflects a starting salary less
than stated in the appropriate collective bargaining agree-
ment considering the total actual experience credits of each
affected teacher. The Association argues that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to individually nego-

1 tiate initial placement on the salary schedule inconsistent
2 with terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The
3 District maintains that the teachers were contracted and
4 paid in accordance with existing school policy and are now
5 estopped from claiming more experience credit contrary to
6 the terms of the individual employment contracts they signed,
7 which contracts are the last writing on the subject.

8 It is well settled that an employer cannot ignore the
9 recognized collective bargaining agent and negotiate indi-
10 vidually with employees on matters inconsistent with the
11 existing collective bargaining agreement. The U.S. Supreme
12 Court held in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) 14
13 LRRM 501, that such individual bargaining was in violation
14 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), Section 8(a)(5),
15 analogous to Section 39-31-401(5) MCA. Citing the J.I. Case
16 Co., supra case, this Board, in ULP #23-78, Fraser Education
17 Association, MEA v. Valley County School District 2 and 2B
18 found that an employer who bargained individually with
19 employees violated Section 39-31-401(5) MCA. (See also
20 Billings Board of Trustees v. Montana, 103 LRRM 2285 (Mont.
21 Sup. Ct. 1979)). In this present matter, the District
22 entered into individual contracts with three teachers which
23 reflect a salary less than that stated in the collective
24 bargaining agreement. The District argues, citing J.I. Case
25 Co., supra., that individual bargaining is not in violation
26 of the Collective Bargaining Act for Public Employees.
27 Furthermore, the District contends that a collective bar-
28 gaining agreement or master agreement does not supercede or
29 proscribe an individual agreement. Although J.I. Case Co.
30 supra indicates that individual contracts may be proper
31 under certain strict circumstances, the Supreme Court con-
32 cluded in J.I. Case Co. supra.:

1 After the collective trade agreement is made,
2 the individuals who shall benefit by it are identified by individual hirings. The employer,
3 except as restricted by the collective agreement
4 itself and except that he must engage in no unfair
5 labor practice or discrimination, is free to
6 select those he will employ or discharge. But the
7 terms of the employment already have been traded
8 out. There is little left to individual agreement
9 except the act of hiring. This hiring may be by
10 writing or by word of mouth or may be implied from
11 conduct. In the sense of contracts of hiring,
12 individual contracts between the employer and
13 employee are not forbidden, but indeed are necessitated by the collective bargaining procedure.

14 But, however engaged an employee becomes
15 entitled by virtue of the Labor Relations Act
16 somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all
17 benefits of the collective trade agreement, even
18 if on his own he would yield to less favorable
19 terms. The individual hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agreement and may
20 not waive any of its benefits...

21 Individual contracts, no matter what the
22 circumstances that justify their execution or what
23 their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or
24 delay the procedures prescribed by the National
25 Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining,
26 nor to exclude the contracting employee from
27 a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they
28 be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or
29 condition the terms of the collective agreement.

30 It is equally clear since the collective
31 trade agreement is to serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the individual contract cannot
32 be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which
33 the employee otherwise would be entitled under the
34 trade agreement. The very purpose of providing by
35 statute for the collective agreement is to supersede
36 the terms of separate agreements of employees
37 with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining
38 power and serve the welfare of the group. Its
39 benefits and advantages are open to every employee
40 of the represented unit, whatever the type or
41 terms of his pre-existing contract of employment.

42 In the matter before the Board, the District entered
43 into individual contracts with the three teachers which
44 addressed items other than just the "act of hiring". In
45 addition, the salary amounts contained in the individual
46 contracts are less than stated in the master agreement
47 considering educational and experience credits. The three
48 teachers did not sign an affidavit to waive educational

1 and/or experience credits as provided for by the master
2 agreement. The individual contracts cannot act as a waiver
3 to a reduced salary level. It is clear that the District
4 bargained individually with employees in violation of Sec-
5 tion 39-31-401(5) MCA.

6 The District argues that this Board has no jurisdiction
7 in this matter because none of the claims involve collective
8 bargaining issues. The District further argues that there
9 are no Montana statutes which authorize this Board to
10 determine wage claims of public employees, including school
11 teachers under contract. The Association is requesting
12 back-pay for three teachers. However, the claim for back-
13 pay was not a simple issue in and by itself. The Associa-
14 tion charged the District with an unfair labor practice which
15 allegedly resulted in a reduction in salary for three teachers.
16 It is determined (see above) that, indeed, the District did
17 commit an unfair labor practice by its action of bargaining
18 individually with employees. This Board does have juris-
19 diction in matters of collective bargaining for public
20 employees, including unfair labor practice charges. (See
21 NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 64 LRM 2065 (U.S. Sup. Ct.
22 1967)).

23 No grievance relating to the alleged misplacement of
24 the three teachers on the salary matrix was filed pursuant
25 to the grievance procedure contained in the collective
26 bargaining agreement (see Stipulated Facts). The District
27 argues that the three teachers are required to exhaust the
28 contractual remedy (grievance procedure) before going to any
29 other forum for adjudication. Furthermore, the District
30 maintains that this Board must honor the terms of a collec-
31 tive bargaining agreement entered into by the parties unless
32 it violates a provision of the Public Employees Collective

1 Bargaining Act. The District's arguments miss the point
2 because at issue in this matter is an unfair labor practice
3 charge. This Board has the power and authority to adjudi-
4 cate such charges (Section 39-31-403 MCA). The authority to
5 remediate unfair labor practices "...shall not be affected
6 by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
7 or may be established by agreement..." (C & S Industries,
8 Inc., 158 NLRB No. 43, 62 LRRM 1043 (1966)). Should the
9 District be implying that the matter of the unfair labor
10 practice charge be deferred to the contract grievance proce-
11 dure, they would be in error. The National Labor Relations
12 Board addressed this question and adopted a prearbitral
13 deferral policy in 1971, Collyer Insulated Wire, 193 NLRB
14 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971). However, one of the key elements
15 of the Collyer Doctrine is the existence of final and bind-
16 ing arbitration in the contractual grievance procedure,
17 Wheeler Const. Co., 219 NLRB 104, 90 LRRM 1173 (1975). The
18 grievance procedure contained in the collective bargaining
19 agreement does not culminate in final and binding arbitra-
20 tion. Therefore, this matter cannot be deferred to the parties
21 for settlement within the boundaries of the agreement, but
22 is properly addressed before this Board.

23 The last issue to be addressed, as I find, is the
24 matter of the five-year experience maximum credit policy
25 adopted by the District. This policy, as explained in the
26 Stipulated Facts, limits new teachers to five years of
27 experience credit in determining placement within the nego-
28 tiated salary matrix. The collective bargaining agreement
29 sets forth no limitations as to placement of new teachers on
30 to the salary matrix except for the signed affidavit waiver
31 provision which was not implemented. The District contends
32 that the teachers were placed upon the salary matrix accord-

1 ing to educational and experience credits declared in the
2 individual contracts and in accordance with school policy.
3 The individual contracts have already been found to be in
4 violation of the Act. We must now address the school policy
5 which limits new teachers to five years of experience.

6 First, I think, we must determine if the policy is a
7 negotiable item or a sole prerogative of the District. The
8 Kansas Supreme Court developed a balancing test to address
9 such a question in N.E.A. v. Shawnee Mission Board of Educa-
10 tion, 512 P2d 426, 94 LRRM 2223 (1973). The Kansas Court
11 said:

12 It does little good, we think, to speak of
13 negotiability in terms of "policy" versus something
14 which is not "policy". Salaries are a matter of
15 policy, and so are vacation and sick leaves. Yet
16 we cannot doubt the authority of the Board to
17 negotiate and bind itself on these questions. The
18 key, as we see it, is how direct the impact of an
19 issue is on the well being of the individual teacher,
20 as opposed to its effect on the operation of the
21 school system as a whole. [Emphasis added] The
22 line may be hard to draw, but in the absence of
23 more assistance from the legislature the courts
24 must do the best they can. The similar phrase-
25 ology of the N.L.R.A. has had a similar history of
26 judicial definition. See Fibreboard Corporation
27 v. Labor Board, 379 U.S. 203, 13 L.Ed. 2d 233, 85
28 S. Ct. 398, 57 LRRM 2609 and especially the con-
29 curring opinion of Stewart, J. at pp. 221-222.

30 The subjects of wages, hours and working conditions are the
31 very root of collective bargaining. Placement on a salary
32 matrix can only be considered a "wage" matter and would have
33 the upmost of direct impact on an individual. Applying the
34 Kansas Court balancing test can only prove that the District's
35 five-year maximum experience policy is a mandatory subject
36 of bargaining.

37 Secondly, we must consider the relationship of the
38 District's policy, which is a mandatory subject of bargaining
39 to the collective bargaining agreement. It is well settled
40 labor law that the duty to bargain is an on-going process.
41
42

1 Unilateral changes in respect to wages, hours and other
2 terms and conditions of employment by an employer during
3 this process is a clear violation of the Act. (See NLRB v.
4 Katz, 50 LRRM 2177 (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1962)). In this matter
5 the District unilaterally established a policy which affected
6 the salaries of employees represented by a collective bar-
7 gaining representative.

8 9 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

10 The Defendant, McCone County School District No. 1,
11 did, by its action of negotiating individually with its
12 employees, violated Section 39-31-401(5) MCA.

13 14 RECOMMENDED ORDER

15 It is hereby ordered that the Defendant, McCone County
16 School District No. 1, shall:

- 17 1. Cease and desist from bargaining individually with
18 employees represented by the Circle Teachers'
19 Association;
- 20 2. Make Daisy Langton, Betty McGarvey and Allan
21 Dancer whole by paying them the difference between
22 their proper salary level and the salaries actually
23 paid between February 15, 1980, and August 15,
24 1980;
- 25 3. Place Daisy Langton on the eight-year experience
26 level of the negotiated salary schedule, effective
27 with the beginning of the 1980-81 school year;
- 28 4. Place Betty McGarvey, when she returns from mater-
29 nity leave, on the experience level consistent
30 with fourteen years of experience, BA + 1, of the
31 negotiated salary schedule, effective upon her
32 return from maternity leave;

1 5. Post these FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2 AND RECOMMENDED ORDER for not less than thirty
3 (30) days in the usual posting location(s) in a
4 conspicuous manner.

6 SPECIAL NOTE

7 Pursuant to Rule ARM 24.26.684, the above RECOMMENDED
8 ORDER shall become the FINAL ORDER of this Board unless
9 written exceptions are filed within 20 days after service of
10 these FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDED
11 ORDER upon the parties

12 DATED this 20th day of April, 1981.

14 BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

15
16 BY Stan Gerke
17 Stan Gerke
18 Hearing Examiner
19

20 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

21 I, Jennifer Jacobson, do hereby certify and state that
22 on the 20 day of April, 1981, I did mail a true and correct
23 copy of the above FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
24 RECOMMENDED ORDER to the following:

25 Emilie Loring
26 Hilley & Loring, P.C.
27 Attorney at Law
1713 Tenth Avenue South
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28 Chadwick H. Smith
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